'A VICTIM OF PROPAGANDA', TIGERS IN COMBAT

Experience report of Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506, Russia, 1943

Nothing beats a good experience report, so I will keep the introduction short.

Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506 (s.Pz.Abt. 506 or sPzAbt. 506) was a heavy tank detachment formed on 8 May 1943 in St. Pölten, Wehrkreis XVII, from III Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 33 of the 9. Panzer-Division for service on the Eastern Front. In August 1943 the Abteilung received 45 Tiger Is. In August 1944 it was equipped with 45 Tiger IIs in Ohrdruf (according to other sources in Paderborn) and subsequently deployed to Arnhem to defend against Operation Market Garden and finally, with Army Group B. On 14 April 1945, after heavy losses in the Ruhr pocket during the final battle for Germany, mainly due to a lack of ammunition and fuel, the detachment was disbanded by its commander in a forest near Iserlohn.

This enlightening report (BArch RH 10/58) summarises the Abteilung’s first experiences on the Eastern Front and was compiled by its commander, Knight’s Cross holder Major Gerhard Willing, who was killed only a few weeks later on 29 October 1943.

If you would like to read more experience reports of this kind, please let me know in the comments.

Panzer-Abteilung 506, 30. September 1943 - SECRET

Commanding Officer

Preliminary field report of Tiger-Abteilung 506

I.) Departure by rail

The detachment was loaded onto 11 transports from 9. September 43, 5pm, to 12. September 43, 6pm, on a head ramp and a special loading head ramp for Tigers, as well as on a side ramp for wheeled vehicles (duration 3 days).

In Znamenka, 25km north-east of Kirovo, the transport track was to be changed to operational track so that the unloading of the Tigers at the final destination would be quicker and take about half an hour per transport via a head ramp. The trains were forwarded via Dnipropetrovsk-Sinelnikovo to Saaproroshje, however, without a change of tracks. On the poor and badly damaged head ramp, unloading took a very long time, so that the transport trains arriving in quick succession had to wait one to one and a half days, which would not have had to happen if the change of tracks had been carried out en route.

Dates of arrival, town of Saporoshje 17th to 20th September 1943.

On 20 September, 9 am, the 9th transport was unloaded. On 20.09, around 3 o'clock, the combined 10th and 11th transport arrived.

The transport tracks had to be left at the station in order to speed up the unloading of the Tigers, which were urgently needed for the operation. Later, the transport tracks were loaded onto the Ssyms-wagons by a work detachment. This caused friction with the station command, but was ruled necessary by the XVII.A.K.. The long unloading made the railway station operation, which was made more difficult by the withdrawing troops, very complicated; all trains arrived undisturbed by partisans, the distribution of the additional hot rations during the journey went well.

II.) Tactical deployment in the bridgehead Saporoshje as a mobile reserve:

Tiger-Abteilung 506 was subordinated to the XVII.A.K on 18. September and on the 20th. September, 12 o'clock, to 9. Panzer-Division, which itself had only three to eight tanks ready for action. This was subordinated to the XXXX.Pz.A.K. to eliminate enemy incursions. 

Due to the formation of the bridgehead Saporoshje, the companies were deployed individually on the 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd of September in places where the Russians tried to break through the weak positions. The armour strengths were 10, 11 and 13 tanks per company.  Each time, the deployment of the Tigers succeeded in repelling the Russians. Continuous action and the many redeployments left little time for technical maintenance of the tanks. There was hardly any time to replenish fuel and ammunition. On the 24th of September the division was deployed with all tanks ready for action in the strength of 13 Tigers, on the 25th of September with 11 and on the 26th of September with 9 Tigers. After the attack on the 26th of September, which was a sortie from the bridgehead into the enemy artillery positions, not a single Tiger was available operationally. 

I drew the attention of the superior office to the fact that in the case of attacks from the bridgehead, defunct Tigers which can no longer be towed must be blown up and will fall into enemy hands.

The 9. Panzer-Division deployed the Tigers in the correct manner, unfortunately, like me, it could not always prevent too much being expected of the Tiger and orders being given to the company commanders that led to unnecessary loss or breakdown of tanks. Propaganda in our press has made the Tiger out to be an invulnerable battering ram, but it can be knocked out by the T34 or the 7.62 Pak head-on at 500 metres, from the side and from the rear at 1500 metres. When clearing incursions, the infantry, who had not exactly been morally strengthened by the retreat, only proceeded if a Tiger accompanied them to the old position. That a barn door will draw all fire on the battlefield and that this will separate the infantry from the Tiger is an old experience, but one that is not believed. The low-profile Sturmgeschütze are suitable for this task, but not the big Tiger, which is 2.88 m high!  The Tiger's strength is its long-range 8.8-cm gun, not its armour. It must not be used as a mobile rampart. If, while leading the infantry forward, the Tigers stopped in a concealed position where they could just as easily provide covering fire as 300 m in front of them, the infantry would stop and would no longer move forward. Then came orders such as: 'Tiger attack too lame, keep moving forward!' If the tanks moved one kilometre so as not to stop midway up a hill, the infantry would stop again, the Tigers having driven away from them. The dense clustering of riflemen behind each tank could not be prevented by orders or instruction, but only by enemy mortar fire. Often the Tigers stood for hours far from the infantry exposed to enemy artillery and mortar fire without the infantry getting close. Standing in such fire for a long time shatters the suspension, anti-tank rifles usually fire at the gun and the vision slits, and anti-tank gun hits damage to the tank at long range, even if they don't penetrate. If a Tiger ever moves off a little and seeks out a more favourable position, the infantry immediately retreats. They believe that if this strong tank cannot withstand the fire, then they certainly cannot.

Lesson: The Tiger supports the infantry's action by direct fire and must have its freedom of movement. The infantry must not stick behind the tiger in a cluster, otherwise it will be exposed to the fire aimed at the tank. The infantry must move in open order as if there were no Tigers with them.

III.) Type of failures of the Tigers due to enemy fire and damage incurred during the first 7 deployments and nights from the 20th to the 26th of September 1943:

1. Six Tigers lost due to direct hits and burning out. The armour was cleanly penetrated. The calibre of the projectile is unknown.  The vehicles burnt out completely, exploded and remain in enemy territory. The tanks were knocked-out at ranges of about 1000 metres. The projectiles were either fired by anti-tank guns, Russian assault guns or artillery.

2. One Tiger was knocked out by a T-34 at about 200 m. Two smooth penetrations in the side of the hull. Hull warped, gearbox, radio and electrical systems damaged, crew wounded. The tank could be salvaged. The tank cannot be repaired in Russia (The T-34 was then destroyed by another Tiger).

3. Four driver's, four radio operator's, one loader's and 2 commander's hatch lids were shot off. The interior was damaged by splinters and the crew was wounded.

4. 8 guns and four gun mantlets were damaged by fire, three of the guns were heavily damaged. 

5. Three final drives destroyed due to hits on the front armour. The protruding side wall of the hull formed a projectile trap and prevented the projectile from sliding off. A crack 1 cm wide developed and the oil leaked out. The tank cannot be repaired in Russia.

6. The armour plates of three the driver's vision slits and six driver's glass blocks were shot off or damaged.

7. One exhaust armour mantlet was shot off.

8. 15 lid latches broke off due to shelling.

9. The suspension of 21 tanks was damaged by shelling, including 6 drive wheels and two idlers.

10. 6 radiators were damaged by splinters caused by firing on the turret.

11. 14 engines failed due to water leaking from the radiator as a result of shelling , water hammer and oiling of the combustion chamber.

12. 3 cowls and two fans were damaged by gunfire.

13. 16 towing ropes and 9 chain suspension ropes were destroyed. 

14. All dry filters, the toolboxes mounted outside at the rear and the turret backpacks were shot. The division had the foresight to order all tools to be stored within the tank.

15. The on-board intercom system failed on 17 Tigers due to vibrations as a result of shelling (four valves, eight relays, three capacitors and two fuses). As a result, the driver could no longer be instructed by the commander, which made command and control extraordinarily difficult, since the vehicle had to be stopped and the engine switched off each time in order to instruct the driver anew.  This proved to be the Tiger's greatest flaw when, at close range, about 10 cannon standing in a cornfield were to be overrun, but the driver could not see them and they fired at the tanks as they advanced.

16. After having expended the ammunition at the gunner's side, the gunner has to fetch the ammunition from a remote box in the tank. For this purpose, the turret has to be turned to three or six o'clock, which has to be practised by all means, as otherwise there will be a great delay in the battle and the best targets will slip away.

Nine loaders and one radio operator fainted due to overexertion and carbon monoxide (CO gases). Refreshing and restorative supplementary rations are required, at least for the loader.

IV.) Technical failures and technical observations:

1. 16 Olvar gearboxes showed damage when shifting from 4th to 5th gear after changing their shape. The screws and retaining pins were no longer being twisted, but the shift fork was being bent. The damage was partially repaired in a makeshift manner.

2. 11 tank engines failed because the centre atomisers in the first stage of the carburettor melted due to the recoil in the carburettor. This caused 9 carburettor fires, the heat sensors and spray nozzles of the independent extinguishing system were partially destroyed.

3. On 20 tanks, a leak in the fan gear caused most of the oil to run away through the oil filler neck and drip into the engine compartment onto the exhaust, which may cause engine fires.

4. Overheating occurred on 8 engines due to incorrect ignition and carburettor settings. The damage could not be determined in advance in Germany because there was not enough fuel for test and practice runs.

5. Due to the lack of fuel filler hoses to be connected to the canisters, fuel flows into the engine compartment. The resulting fuel vapours penetrate into the fighting compartment and severely hinder the crew. Fires can easily occur. The hoses are obtained from an inspector in Germany.

6. When the Tiger is reversing or when the wind is blowing from behind, the exhaust gases are sucked into the fighting compartment, causing the crew to be severely hindered by the CO-gases.

7. When driving backwards, small steering movements shed the tracks six times. The resulting tension in the tracks could only be released by cutting the individual tracks open with a welder. 

8. Fuel consumption when driving in medium-heavy terrain, including warming up the engines and turret rotation in combat, is 8 to 10 litres per kilometre, not 5 litres.

9. Due to combustion gases escaping from the gun barrel and the shell cases, a strong CO content develops inside the tank, so that commanders' and gunners' hatches had to be opened. The fan does not extract enough.

10. The escape hatch must receive the hinge on the side, so that the hatches can be used to confer with another vehicle or with infantry leaders. With the present location of the hinges on the lower side, the escape hatch cannot be closed by one man due to its weight, but must be closed by two men from the outside.

11. Technical faults in the on-board telephone and radio system: four short circuits on the slip ring, three slip ring collector carbons broken, two 10-wire cables from the slip ring to the turret connection (Pz-Kasten 5c) disconnected.

V.) Complicating repairs:

Since the Division has only five towing vehicles instead of the regular 13, and since 3 towing vehicles are needed to tow a Tiger in the mountainous terrain, the broken down vehicles could only slowly be brought to the workshop company. The Panzer-Berge-Kompanie 3 of the XXXX.Pz.A.K. provided 4 towing vehicles on 26.09.43 upon request.  Due to the relocation of the tank spare parts depot from Dnepropetrovsk to the vicinity of Berditchev (about 600 km as the crow flies), the procurement of spare parts is very difficult and repairs take longer than in Germany. Since the detachment was newly formed and had little experience with Tigers, it was not possible to stockpile spare parts. The workshop company was newly formed and consists mostly of mechanics who have not yet worked on the tank.  Furthermore, the equipment of toolboxes has not been delivered completely, the most important part missing is the electric welding kit, which is absolutely necessary for welding the ruptured seams. 

VI.) Conclusion

The Tiger was praised in the press by much propaganda as an invulnerable and genuine life insurance, so that both superior offices as well as the ordinary infantryman had to believe that by using this fortress they could always do everything. But that is not the case! The Russians fire all their weapons into the suspension, the gun and the vision slits. Because of the heavy artillery fire and the smoke and dust, it was often impossible to do any shooting ourselves.  With the direct hits that the Tigers received, relatively few penetrations were achieved. Many vehicles were disabled, but the crews remained protected for the most part. Nevertheless, during the first seven days and nights of deployment of 45 Tigers (41 of which were in action), the division suffered the following casualties among the tank crews:

 9 dead ( of which two were officers),

 16 seriously wounded (of which 3 were officers) and

 20 lightly wounded (3 of them officers)

After the 7 days of deployment, not a single Tiger was left operational (6 were total losses, shot-up, burnt out and exploded).

Even the Tiger is vulnerable and must be deployed like the other tank if it is to be successful and have few casualties. Deployment as a closed unit and not split-up on a broad front along the main battle line. If the Tigers have to be split up because the situation requires it, then the stationary Tiger lying in wait is superior to any attacking enemy. However, if few Tigers advance into enemy terrain, they can easily become a prey to the combined fire of the enemy's defensive weapons. In this case it becomes a victim of the propaganda built around it! 

Willing

Major and Division Commander

Major Gerhard Willing (RS)