SURGICAL STRIKE: EXPERIENCES OF A STUKA ACE, PART 1

Attack procedures of dive bombers on naval targets: Operational experience of III./St.G.1. against England and in the Mediterranean Sea’ (1940-41), AN

INTRODUCTION

The author of the below essay titled: ‘Attack procedures of dive bombers on naval targets: Operational experience of III./St.G.1. against England and in the Mediterranean Sea’ was Oberstleutnant (ret.) Helmut Mahlke, who wrote it for the (US) Historical Division of the Air Force Project, later the German Air Force (GAF) monograph project in 1952/53. It was written to support the compilation of GAF monograph No. 163, German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, which was published in 1962.

Mahlke’s essay however, which today can be found in the German Federal Archives¹ was never published in full or in the English language, a negligence which I decided to remedy in this two-part article. The essays offer a unique and fascinating insight into the realities faced by the men who flew the Junker Ju 87 Sturzkampfbomber (dive-bomber, short ‘Stuka’), the most famous ground attack aircraft of the Second World War, and the operational tactics and procedures which allowed them to operate successfully. To find out more about Mahlke I recommend reading his autobiography Memoirs of a Stuka Pilot, the latest English edition of which was published by Frontline Books in 2013.

As usual I have kept Luftwaffe terminology, ranks and unit designations in the German language. A brief explanation of the most commonly encountered terms can be found in the footnotes²

Helmut Mahlke was born on 27 August 1913 in Berlin-Lankwitz, experienced one of the most interesting careers in German military history. As a 19-year-old, he became an airline pilot through pre-military training at the at the German Commercial Aviation School (DVS) in Warnemünde from 1 April to 28 August 1932. This was followed by his training as an officer in the Kriegsmarine from 28 August 1932 to 30 April 1935, during which he served from from 6 November 1932 to 2 January 1934 on the cruiser Köln. With the unmasking of the Luftwaffe on 30 April 1935, Mahlke was transferred to this new service arm, as was his entire course. From 1 May 1935 to 9 March 1936 he served in Warnemünde as a naval observer, on 1 October 1935 he war promoted to Leutnant. From 10 March 1936 to 28 February 1938 he served as a training advisor in the staff of the Command of the Schools (Sea) in Warnemünde. On 1 April 1937 he was promoted to Oberleutnant. On 1 March 1938 transferred to Bordfliegerstaffel 1/196 in Wilhelmshaven as naval observer with shipboard commands on the armoured cruisers Admiral Scheer, Deutschland and Graf Spee. Shortly before the outbreak of war Mahlke completed his Stuka pilot training in Kitzingen and at the beginning of the war he became Staffelkapitän of the 2./Träger-Stuka-Staffel 186, which was then used in the West as part of the operational air force mainly in support of the army. As a Hauptmann (1 April 1940), he took over the Träger-Stuka Staffel, which at the same time was renamed III./Stuka-Geschwader 1, since it was never used in its intended role as a carrier based formation. With this Gruppe Mahlke was in action on the Channel until 19 November 1941. On 23 February 1941, the Gruppe moved to Sicily for operations against Malta and in Africa, where Mahlke himself was hit on 26 February by a direct hit of an anti-aircraft shell, which blew a huge hole in the wing of his machine. Using all his flying skills he managed to get back to base. On 21 May, the group transferred to the Peloponnese and flew heavy operations against Crete until 2 June 1941. For this the Italian Medal of Valour in silver on 20 November 1941.With the start of the war in the east, the III/St.G. 1 was in action against airfields, bridges and tanks in the central sector. In just under three weeks, Mahlke was shot down three times, and always bailed out into enemy territory. Twice he fought his way back to the German lines. On 8 July, however, an assault platoon of the army had to fetch him back seriously wounded after an attack on tank positions near Latigalski. On 16 July 1941, in the field hospital in Borrissow, Captain Mahlke was awarded the Knight's Cross after 145 combat flights. His radio operator during most of the missions was Unteroffizier Fritz Baudisch. From 6 September 1941, Mahlke, who became a Major on 1 June 1942, worked in the Luftwaffenkommando Ost, later Luftflottenkommando 6, finally as Ia in the rank of Oberstleutnant in the General Staff. Mahlke did not return from captivity until 9 September 1947. He joined the new German Armed Forces on 16 November 1955, was promoted Oberst on 19 September 1956, a Brigade General on 30 August 1960, and from 11 January 1963 to 28 February 1966 as Fleet Admiral in charge of the naval aviation units of the Bundeswehr. Transferred back to the Luftwaffe on 1 March 1966, Mahlke was Commanding General of the Luftwaffengruppe Nord from 1968 to 1970 as Generalleutnant until he retired on 30 September 1970. In 159 combat missions he sank two destroyers, one submarine and 29 merchant ships, making him one of the most successful Stuka pilots of the war.

Attack procedures of dive bombers against naval targets

by Helmut Mahlke, Translation: Robin Schäfer

Operational experience of III./St.G.1. against England and in the Mediterranean Sea

The peculiarity of naval target engagement led to the development of special attack procedures based on operational experience, by means of which the greatest possible success could be ensured with the lowest risk of loss in later operations. 

This development of attack procedures will be illustrated here with examples from the anti-shipping operations of III./St.G.1. 

III. Gruppe of St.G.1 was originally intended for the deployment from the aircraft carrier. Most of the flying personnel had come from the Kriegsmarine. For this reason, the Gruppe was used primarily for missions against England and in the Mediterranean - Sicily, Africa - against naval targets, even after the old core of naval flyers had been reduced to individual crews due to personnel losses, while the majority of the junior crews had gone through the usual Stuka pilot training without special training for fighting naval targets. 

The Gruppe was first deployed against naval targets at Dunkirk. Here it was important to prevent or delay the departure of the encircled armies by sea by destroying the means of sea transport. On 29 May 1940, the Gruppe first destroyed the Dunkirk locks, making it impossible for the enemy to use the inner harbour. On 1 June 1940 the Gruppe flew 3 sorties against ships off Dunkirk. 

The ships assembled for the evacuation of enemy troops were mostly small units, sometimes also tugs with 2-3 prams in tow, which were encountered in large numbers in the sea area off Dunkirk as far as the English south coast. Accordingly, the approach followed the usual attack procedure at an altitude of approx. 3500 m above a broken cloud cover. Over the target area the Gruppe disbanded for a Kettenangriff (lit. ‘attack in chain’). The individual Ketten attacked the largest sighted naval vessels in a steep dive (through the broken cloud cover) with a free choice of targets; altitude of bomb release 500 m, fuse setting 'mV' (with delay). With favourable wind conditions - light, steady winds, no wind shifts in higher altitude - hit accuracy was generally good and the success satisfactory. 

In one case, the mine effect of a 500 kg bomb could be observed. After breaking through the cloud cover, a Staffelkapitän saw that another Kette was attacking the same target as he was. By diving in steps he switched targets and attacked a steamer of 3,000 t running at high speed. Due to the target change, the release altitude had become so low that the fuse did not respond with delay, but with latency. The impact was sharp in front of the bow of the ship, which passed over the point of impact at high speed. 

Due to shallow water, the explosion then occurred under the middle of the ship, so that it was torn apart and entire superstructure parts flew through the air. Such an effect could not be observed in later attacks in deep water, meaning that hits of this kind must be described as accidental, since all later experience shows that no bomb effect is achieved even with only very small lateral deviations. Damage to the underwater hull, which could result in the sinking of a ship, was only possible with hits close to the ship's side (under 3 to at most 5 m from the ship). 

The combined aircraft of III./St.G.1 did not score a single hit on the steamer! Thereupon II./St.G.1 attacked at the same target as 'easy prey'. But the II. Gruppe did not score a single hit either! This devastating result gave pause for thought. The wind shift in high altitude and the inaccurate weather forecast for the target area were the reason for the 'failure'. This possibility of failure also had to be taken into account for future missions, since exact wind determination by drift measurement was not possible for longer overseas flights from inside the Ju 87 due to the lack of the necessary on-board equipment. In addition, the accuracy had to be such that the attacked ship was sunk by a direct hit, not just damaged. Thus an attack procedure had to be found which eliminated all sources of error in the targeting procedure. For this purpose two solutions were found, which were subsequently applied depending on the defensive situation at the target and in each case led to complete success, namely

1. In shallow dive with little anti-aircraft defence from the target (merchant ships!)

2. In a steep dive against sea targets with strong defensive armament (warships!)

With the shallow dive method, the sinking of a merchant ship of any size could be guaranteed by a Kette of Ju 87 (500 kg + 4 x 50 kg bombs). As an example, three attacks of III/St.G.1 against convoys in the outer Thames estuary on 1 November, 8 November and 11 November 1940, in which 18-21 aircraft of the Gruppe were deployed in each case; 28,000 t, 18,000 t and 37,000 t, thus a total of 83,000 t of merchant shipping space, wer sunk, with our side losing (through fighter defence) of a total of three Ju 87s.

The attacks took place at normal approach altitude (3,500 m, without oxygen equipment) in Gruppe formation. The strong convoys (50-80 ships) which were sighted coming in and out of the narrow channel from the Thames Estuary during these attacks were, according to the preliminary briefing, to be thought of as divided into three parts, of which each squadron had to identify the three largest ships in 'its third' and attack them by Ketten in the corresponding division of targets.

As a result, despite strong fighter defences, the attack of the individual Ketten of the unit stretched very far apart. This resulted in a considerable moment of weakness in terms of defence, but this was far outweighed by the safety of the attack itself (no flying into the impact of the bomb dropped by the man in front) and above all by the possibilities of success. 

After this basic division of targets, the individual Ketten (in limited 'free target selection') set out to attack the target sections assigned to them in a steep dive. Direction of attack: Without regard to the wind direction from behind in the direction of travel of the ship. In the steep dive, an imaginary point approx. 1000 m to 1500 m behind the ship was attacked first. At an altitude of about 1000 m, the steep dive was then flattened and the stern of the ship was approached in a steep glide or 'flat dive' of about 30°-45°.  This was done by firing on the ship's stern anti-aircraft machine guns (AA cannon or machine guns on merchant ships are always mounted on the stern and bow), in order to make the ship's anti-aircraft gunners nervous and to disrupt their effective firing against 'aircraft on central approach'. Then the ship's guns continued to fire over the ship's upper deck, the fire was briefly aimed at the ship's gunnery crew (flight height now approx. 200 m to 150 m), and was then pulled through a little more until it whipped into the water in front of the ship's bow, and at this moment the bomb button was pressed (the ship was no longer in the gunner's sights, but was covered by the engine cowling).

In this attack and bombing procedure, the bomb had to hit just behind the bridge superstructure in the middle of the ship!

Aiming errors were no longer possible. Missed drops or bomb impacts in the water were only observed in a few exceptional cases, which were probably due to the fact that individual bombs bounced off the ship at an unfavourable point of impact. This possibility was compensated by the application of one Kette each against one ship, the bomb load of which, even with single ricochets, was sufficient for a sinking in any case. Success (see above) in the attack with 21 Ju 87s against convoys in the Thames Estuary on 11 November 1940, after which 37,000 tons of enemy merchant shipping were reported sunk based on the visual observations of the aircrews of the unit. This tonnage figure was confirmed as accurate by the image analysis of the Luftflottenkommando's long-range reconnaissance, which had captured these convoys in aerial photographs before and shortly after the attack. 

(The difficulty of estimating tonnage from the air is, even with the best knowledge of ship types, best overcome by the rule of thumb: 1000 GRT per cargo hatch or cargo beam; large differences from this rule of thumb could not occur).

The greatest moment of weakness in these widely dispersed attacks of the individual Ketten was the assembly of the formation to a sufficient defensive force against enemy fighters, which despite our own strong and effective fighter protection (in the aforementioned attacks in the Thames this was supplied two Jagdgeschwader led by Mölders and in later operations by Galland) could, in small numbers or with single aircraft, always penetrate to the Stuka formation. The time from the attack to the assembly of the formation had to be shortened. To do this, the formation leader flew wide loops at right angles to the ordered return course with the engine at a very low speed (less than 200 km/h), and gave 'rallying signals' by wobbling around the longitudinal axis. This was not yet a patent solution, however, as in hazy weather (limited visibility even with a cloudless blue sky) it sometimes occurred that the youngest crews in particular had lost contact and on the return flight they tried to regroup at a higher speed. The result was that all the other aircraft in the formation tried to rally to the first departing aircraft, assuming that this must be the formation leader.

Adolf Galland as Kommodore of Jagdgeschwader 26 on the Channel Front in April 1941, shortly after claiming his 60th aerial victory. (author’s collection).

In such cases, the low power peak of the Ju 87 made rapid assembly impossible, as the last aircraft could not catch up even with the most extreme speed. The patent solution was found on the basis of an order from the higher command, which at this time ordered that in order to avoid excessive losses among formation leaders, their flying at the head of their formations was prohibited and they had to choose another position in the formation from which they could lead without particularly conspicuous exposure of their person. 

III/St.G.1 refused to carry out this order, since the formation was only guided by visual signals, which could only be given from the front, while radio silence was ordered as a matter of principle, except in cases of maritime distress, since experience had shown that every radio message immediately alerted the enemy's fighter defence. In addition, the Gruppenkommandeure and  Staffelkapitäne claimed to be in a much better position to hold their own against a larger number of attacking enemy fighters due to their greater flying experience than could be expected of crews with no flying experience. 

The above-mentioned order resulted in the opposite measure: the aircraft of the Gruppenkommandeure and  Staffelkapitäne were marked in a particularly conspicuous manner, namely Gruppenkommandeure : both landing gear fairings of the aircraft sprayed yellow, Staffelkapitäne: one landing gear fairing sprayed yellow. This was intended to encourage the enemy's fighter defence to target these eye-marked aircraft in order to spare and relieve the younger crews. 

Experience in air combat had shown in many cases that the Ju 87 could outmanoeuvre up to five simultaneously attacking Spitfires, if the pilot had enough experience to observe all attackers sufficiently and to take the necessary defensive measures at the right moment. As a rule these were: low speed, counter-curves to attack with fixed machine guns against the approaching fighter (although with two rigid guns no great successes could be expected, the massive looking Ju 87, when flying stubbornly on collision course towards the fighter, always had such an impressive effect, that the fighter preferred to turn away before it could fire a properly aimed burst. The most difficult thing was to outmanoeuvre several fighters when they attacked from different directions at the same time. They all had to be watched simultaneously to catch the moment when one of them would have to open fire if he wanted to hit something. At that moment, a quick yank on the stick was enough to make a 'jump up' so that the fighter's salvo passed under the Ju 87. Since an escape was out of the question due to the low speed of the Ju 87 in relation to the fighter, the Ju 87 had to 'oppose' until the fighters had expanded their ammunition. In this connection it should be mentioned that in many cases after such a dogfight - when the ammunition had been exhausted - the British fighters flew close to the Ju 87 in parallel flight and signed off with a sporting military salute before heading home in a half-roll. After these air battles, the Ju 87s usually brought home more or less severe damage, but were robust enough to give the experienced aircraft pilot the absolute feeling of safety in air combat. In one case a Ju 87 belonging to a squadron captain returned from a mission without a single hit, after a whole squadron of Spitfires (apparently younger crews) had fired off all their ammunition in the dogfight with the Stuka. 

The yellow paint on the landing gear fairings of the commander's and squadron captains' aircraft made it much easier for all crews to collect after the attack. The only order to rally was: 'Close in on yellow legs!', crews who flew past the marked aircraft of the formation leaders on departure from the target were threatened with punishment. With these recognition aids, the rallying of the unit was ensured in the shortest possible time (approx. 3 minutes) even in the case of the most widespread separation of the individual attacks. In the case of naval target attacks, rallying and target departure as well as return flights were carried out in low-level flight, in a Sauhaufen (lit. ‘'bunch of sows’, a ‘bunch of slobs’, ‘untidy’) formation. Due to the low-level flight, a fighter attack from the Ju 87's defensive blind spot (from the rear below) was not possible. The formation, which was very characteristically called a Sauhaufen, was the most effective protection against fighter attacks from the remaining favourable attack direction for fighters, namely from the rear. The last aircraft of the formation was the most exposed to enemy fighter attacks (the Devil takes the hindmost!), since the weak defensive armament (1 x MG 15) of the other aircraft of the formation could only be brought to bear against an attacker from the rear to a limited extent and at long firing distances. The Sauhaufen formation therefore aimed at ensuring that - as long as enemy fighters were to be expected - no aircraft was tied to the position as 'last in the group', and that in the event of a fighter attack the best possible mutual support of the aircraft of the group could be ensured for its defence. The Sauhaufen worked like this: The formation leader flew at a very low engine speed (200 to 220 km/h) on a return course, so that all aircraft had plenty of speed reserves (50-80 km/h reserve). If an enemy fighter attacked one of the last planes of the formation, it accelerated to full throttle, flew over the other planes of the formation and then pressed into the middle of the formation, here again switching to low-level flight. If the fighter did not break off its attack against this aircraft, other aircraft of the group behind the fighter came into firing position for the fixed on-board guns. The fighter escaped this situation by turning and breaking off the approach, usually before it had even fired. If the enemy fighter, in order to avoid such situations from the outset, changed targets during his approach, his firing became so inaccurate that - apart from very isolated exceptions - it could not be successful, especially as the aircraft of the formation attacked during the change of target had the freedom of manoeuvre for suitable defensive movements. 

Thus the chances for attacking fighters to hit the Sauhaufen were very small, as long as they could not force all aircraft of the formation to engage in turning battles by strong numerical superiority. The latter, however, only came into question when the attackers were 3 to 5 times superior, and in such a case it was easier to outmanoeuvre 3-5 attacking fighters in a turning battle than to additionally focus on mutual support within the formation. 

However, such air battles against such heavily superior enemy forces were rare cases, which could only occur if the own fighter protection did not function properly or recognised the situation too late. An example is the air combat in the channel area Dover-Calais on 14 November 1940, where every aircraft of the unit was involved in turning battles against at least 5-10 Spitfires at the same time; duration approx. 15 minutes; losses apart from heavy strafing damage - up to 130 hits per aircraft - two Ju 87 total losses, one of them by anti-aircraft guns at Dover. 

Individual enemy fighters or fighter squadrons, which had broken through our own fighter screen, were not able to achieve any successes against a Stuka group flying in the Sauhaufen formation As the most impressive example for an attack of Stukas against naval targets (carried out according to the above principles), here again a reference to the attack of the III/St.G.1 on 11 November 1940 at noon against convoys in the Thames estuary: (To the knowledge of the author, this was the penultimate daylight attack flown by a closed unit against England). 19 Ju 87 of the III./St.G.1 were deployed under heavy fighter protection (two Geschwader led by Adolf Galland). Target approach at 3,500 m. Very strong enemy fighter defence in the target area was tied up by our excellently functioning fighter screen (forming a ‘cheese dome’ around the formation), so that only very sporadic enemy fighters penetrated the unit during the target approach, but were not successful. Attack in a steep dive, changing over to a shallow dive. Return in low-level flight in a Saufhaufen formation. Success: 37,000 GRT sunk. Gruppe losses: None! The latter result deserves special attention, since even during the initial flight and the return march there were continuous attacks by individual enemy fighters, which were, however, without exception rendered ineffective by the behaviour of the unit described above. 

This infallible attack method for the destruction of merchant ships ( low level attack, shallow dive) was not applicable in every case for the following reasons:

In attacks against warships, no sufficient bomb effect could be expected using this method, since the angle of impact of the bomb - due to the low release altitude in the shallow dive, or due to the glide angle, was so shallow that the bomb could not penetrate the horizontal armour with which at least the most important parts of all newer warships were secured against attacks from the air. A bomb falling flat on this horizontal armour could either smash without effect or destroy and damage only the superstructure above the armour. To wound a warship, the bomb had to penetrate the horizontal armour, making it necessary to drop it at the steepest angle (80°-85°, as close as possible to the 90° angle of attack).

In addition, when attacking warships, there was a very heavily massed anti-aircraft defence of all calibres in the centre of the target, which fired particularly well in all navies, but especially in the British Navy, and had extraordinarily good chances of downing a 'standing target in central approach' which did not deviate from its course in the target dive. 

For these reasons, only the usual steep dive attack method could be used to attack warships. The possible aiming errors caused by incorrect target documentation were eliminated by disciplined formation attack:

According to the weather forecast, the lead angle and the release altitude were firmly fixed in the briefing with the crews. Furthermore, the command bridge or the mast was ordered as the best visible point on the ship. With these aiming points the Kommandeur attacked the target and dropped his bomb exactly according to the ordered visor settings and aiming points - even if he had found out during the attack that these points had been made obsolete by a change of wind and thus his bomb had to miss the target. The following Ketten corrected their aiming according to the placement of the first bomb impact, but otherwise adhered exactly to the ordered visor settings and release altitude. With disciplined adherence to the attack orders, theoretically all further bombs had to be on target on the basis of this correction. And indeed this was generally the case. 

This procedure naturally required the attack of several aircraft on the same target in order to guarantee its sinking (at least one Staffel). 

Example: Mission in Africa on 18 April 1941 against an enemy warship reported by the Army, which fired on friendly positions near El Alamein from the sea with heavy calibres. Departure from Derna at 09:45 with 12 Ju 87's. After surveying the enemy-free sea area near El Alamein, the unit finally encountered an approx. 8000 GRT coastal armoured ship of older design north of Sollum Bay. The wind data according to the weather forecast were outdated, as there was almost no wind. Therefore the bombs of the leading Kette, dropped with ordered settings, fell 20-30 m in front and to the left of the ship. With the appropriate correction, the entire bomb load of the following Kette of the Staffelkapitän hit the forecastle and pushed it under water. The next Kette hit the stern with the entire bomb load. The last Kette returned to base with bombs, as during the dive the target was already under water.

For the determination of the release altitude, the strength of the anti-aircraft defence at the target was decisive. The target dive itself was carried out without any consideration of the anti-aircraft guns of all calibres in order to enable safe aiming. However, the strength of the anti-aircraft defence in the target had to be taken into account insofar as the release altitude had to be set higher in the case of particularly strong fire concentration than in the case of weak defence (highest release altitude 700 m, lowest 300 m or flat drop, see above). 

This measure was based on the consideration that the combat mission could only be fulfilled if the bomb was released and armed before the Ju 87 itself exploded! The sober reality of this reasoning can only be appreciated by those who have flown a dive attack against such a centrally massed defence of light and medium AA on target. The tracer rounds passed to the right, left, above and below the fuselage at a distance of less than one meter from the aircraft’s canopy in such quantities that the pilot had the impression that he was flying into an ever narrowing burning hosepipe. He was caught by this anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 2,500 m and had to plunge through this hosepipe of fire up to a distance of 1,000 m, and when further tracer projectiles coming from different directions crossed in front of and behind his own aircraft, then came the moment when even the most stubborn Stuka pilot thought: 'Now it must blow up'! And before it 'went boom' he had to press the bomb release button so that the whole thing would at least have made some sense. This had nothing to do with questions of courage, because pressing the button does not switch off the anti-aircraft fire: the pilot had to go through that anyway! From that moment on, however, he no longer had to concentrate on the aiming process, but could devote his attention to the enemy's defences and take evasive action accordingly.

As a matter of principle, the aim of naval bombing had to be to attack ships at sea (under steam), because then sinking could be achieved with far greater certainty than with ships in port. In the case of ships on the high seas, the explosive effect of the bombs is often intensified by boiler explosions; likewise, a water inrush has a much stronger effect on underwater damage at sea, while ships in port can often still be secured and docked for repair in the case of heavy damage from direct hits by tugboats and auxiliary vessels that are quickly called in.

In the case of attacks against ships in port (e.g. Valetta on Malta, Tobruk), the actual success of the attack could generally not be clearly determined because the ships attacked were severely damaged by direct hits and partly sunk due to them, but a final destruction or the degree of damage could not be determined with certainty.  The attack on ships at sea was also to be sought because the sinking then also resulted in the destruction of the ship's cargo, before it reached its port of destination and could be unloaded. In addition, the execution of a Stuka attack against naval targets in the harbour was much more difficult and risky for the attacking aircraft due to the incomparably stronger ground and air defences, since the most important supply ports in particular were where the enemy's strongest and best air defences were concentrated, whereby surprises regarding their type, strength and position always had to be reckoned with. 

When attacking a naval target on the high seas, the expected anti-aircraft defences of the attacked convoy could be readily anticipated. The attack could be launched on approach and departure in such a way that these anti-aircraft weapons could only fire to limited effect for a short time.  In contrast, when attacking naval targets in harbours, several anti-aircraft barriers had to be broken through, the positions of which were not always known in advance, so that the anti-aircraft weapons of all calibres positioned far around the harbour area, usually in several belts, could have an effect on the attacking formation over a much longer period of time and from different, sometimes surprising, directions at the same time. The response of the formation had to be adapted according to the respective defence situation.  In this respect, the following principles were developed through experience, which limited the risk of loss to the unavoidable minimum. 

1. The target approach against heavily AA-protected targets was carried out at altitudes above the effective range of the light and medium AA weapons (generally at an altitude of 3,000 to 3,500 m).  Before reaching the area of fire of the heavy anti-aircraft guns, the closed deployment of the aircraft was broken up to form a group line, in order to be able to exploit the manoeuvrability of the single aircraft as the best defence against the heavy AA and to enable a well-aimed dive of the individual aircraft. As soon as the first muzzle flash of the heavy AA-guns was detected, some sharp turns were flown which rendered even the best fire control ineffective due to the flight time of the shells. As soon as the blast clouds of the first AA salvos could be seen in front of the formation, these were flown towards, since a second shell hardly ever hits exactly the same spot as its predecessor.  This method of defence against heavy AA-guns was also based on the general observation that much of what AA barrages achieved, tended to limit itself to cover large areas of sky with blast clouds, as if a blast cloud alone was still an obstacle to the approaching aircraft. The British heavy anti-aircraft guns, for example at Valetta on Malta, where they were concentrated in particular strength, presented the attacking formation with three such AA barriers, which were staggered according to altitude. The first barrier was placed approximately at approach altitude, the second one shortly after the attacking Gruppe had to initiate its dive about 500 m to 800 m below that, and thus in front of the attacking Gruppe. The third barrier was again about 1000 m lower than the second. All these AA barriers were easily outmanoeuvred by flying towards the last detonation points. An aircraft successfully shot down by heavy AA-guns could only be a coincidence and is known to the author only from one case during a mission using this method (also over Valetta), whereby it remains unclear whether the explosion of the Ju 87 in the middle of the formation was caused by AA fire or by other influences.

2. The dive onto the target itself took place without any consideration of the anti-aircraft defences of all calibres.

3. Departure from the target: As soon as the bomb had been released and the on-board gun attacks provided for in the attack order had been carried out, the only principle that applied to the behaviour of the individual aircraft and of the formation in the face of the defences, was to bring the aircraft home as safely as possible. In addition, the target descent had to be timed in such a way that the light AA barrages were penetrated by the shortest possible route, since the light and medium AA-guns firing from forward positions was far more difficult to outmanoeuvre by the aircraft's defensive movements than the volleys of projectiles sent after the aircraft from aft positions. As soon as the light AA-gun positions were overflown, so that the tracer came from behind, the pilot could control this precisely. Directional corrections of the light AA-fire could be recognised by a kink in the flight path of the tracer. If this kink pointed towards one's own aircraft, the projectile path had to be skipped-over with a short jerk of the control stick. The flight time of the projectiles gave a skilful pilot sufficient time for this.

4. Return flight: depending on the air situation, the regrouping of the unit usually took place outside the area of effect of the light AA-guns. Departure and return over the sea at low level.

STAY TUNED FOR PART TWO! (COMING SOON!)

1. RL 10/512, 10/513

2. Flak: Anti-aircraft gun

Fliegerkorps: An operational command controlling an unspecified number of units. Subsidiary to a Luftflotte.

Geschwader: An operational unit similar to an RAF Group. Normally comprising three operational Gruppen and a Staff Flight, with a total establishment of about 100 aircraft. It also possessed a fourth training Gruppe, and later in the war a fifth Gruppe was added to some Geschwadern. Prefixed Kampf (Bomber) or Zerstörer (Long-range fighter) ie KG 55, ZG 26 etc.

Gruppe: (plural: Gruppen) An operational unit similar to an RAF Wing. Normally comprised three Staffeln and a Staff flight with a total establishment of 30 aircraft. Abbreviated I/KG 55 etc.

Gruppenkommandeur: Officer commanding a Gruppe.

Ju: Junkers Flugzeug-und Motorenwerken AG.

Kriegsmarine: German Navy.

Luftflotte: Air Fleet. An operational command controlling a number of subsidiary Fliegerkorps.

Luftwaffe: The German Airforce

Staffel: (plural: Staffeln) The smallest Luftwaffe operational unit similar to an RAF Squadron normally comprising 9 aircraft. 1,2 and 3 Staffeln were in I Gruppe; 4,5 and 6 in II Gruppe; 7,8, and 9 in III Gruppe; 10,11 and 12 in IV Gruppe; 13,14 and 15 in V Gruppe. Abbreviated 7/KG 100 etc.

Staffelkäpitan: Officer commanding a Staffel.